skills/tul-sh/skills/agent-tools/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agent-tools

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the installation and update of the infsh CLI through a shell pipe pattern (curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh). This method executes remote code without prior inspection, creating a significant risk of arbitrary code execution if the remote server or the network connection is compromised.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads various resources, including platform-specific binaries, checksum files, and metadata manifests, from dist.inference.sh and cli.inference.sh during the setup and update processes.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to execute infsh commands, which involves managing system processes, local authentication, and network-based AI task execution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by accepting user-supplied prompts and JSON data for processing by various AI applications.
  • Ingestion points: User prompts and input files are ingested via the infsh app run --input command as described in SKILL.md and references/running-apps.md.
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are implemented to protect the tool input.
  • Capability inventory: The infsh tool can perform network operations, file writing (via --save), and access remote AI services (e.g., Twitter/X, search engines).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization before external content is passed to the underlying CLI tool.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 4, 2026, 10:05 AM