skills/tul-sh/skills/python-sdk/Gen Agent Trust Hub

python-sdk

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation (references/tool-builder.md) includes examples that use the eval() function to process arguments from tool calls (e.g., result = eval(call.args['expression'])). This is a critical security vulnerability if implemented, as it allows the LLM to execute arbitrary Python code on the host system.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The SDK provides a built-in code_execution capability (references/agent-patterns.md) that can be enabled via internal_tools().code_execution(True). This grants the agent the ability to run code in its environment, which is a high-risk feature.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires broad permissions to execute Bash(python *) and Bash(pip install inferencesh), which are necessary for the SDK's operation but provide a wide attack surface for command injection.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its design for processing untrusted external data. Ingestion points: Processes user messages, file attachments (references/files.md), and tool outputs like search results (references/agent-patterns.md). Boundary markers: None are present in the provided examples to delimit untrusted content. Capability inventory: Possesses code execution capabilities and file system access via Bash tools. Sanitization: Examples show a lack of sanitization, specifically with the direct evaluation of tool arguments.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions specify the installation of the inferencesh package and its dependencies (requests, aiohttp, etc.) from the public PyPI registry.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 12, 2026, 08:26 AM