python-sdk
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation (references/tool-builder.md) includes examples that use the
eval()function to process arguments from tool calls (e.g.,result = eval(call.args['expression'])). This is a critical security vulnerability if implemented, as it allows the LLM to execute arbitrary Python code on the host system. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The SDK provides a built-in
code_executioncapability (references/agent-patterns.md) that can be enabled viainternal_tools().code_execution(True). This grants the agent the ability to run code in its environment, which is a high-risk feature. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires broad permissions to execute
Bash(python *)andBash(pip install inferencesh), which are necessary for the SDK's operation but provide a wide attack surface for command injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its design for processing untrusted external data. Ingestion points: Processes user messages, file attachments (references/files.md), and tool outputs like search results (references/agent-patterns.md). Boundary markers: None are present in the provided examples to delimit untrusted content. Capability inventory: Possesses code execution capabilities and file system access via Bash tools. Sanitization: Examples show a lack of sanitization, specifically with the direct evaluation of tool arguments.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions specify the installation of the
inferenceshpackage and its dependencies (requests, aiohttp, etc.) from the public PyPI registry.
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