cflx-workflow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the command
npx @fission-ai/openspec@latestin its operational steps as documented incflx-apply.mdandcflx-archive.md. This command downloads and executes external code from the NPM registry at runtime. The organization@fission-aiis not a trusted vendor and is not associated with the skill author 'tumf'. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Operational instructions and reference files recommend using
npxto fetch and run tools or updates from the public@fission-airepository at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is explicitly configured to bypass human-in-the-loop safety measures. Instructions such as 'CRITICAL
- This skill CANNOT ask questions', 'NO QUESTIONS', and 'All decisions must be made autonomously' prevent the agent from seeking clarification if it encounters ambiguous or malicious instructions within its context.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its automated ingestion of external markdown files without validation.
- Ingestion points: Files located at
openspec/changes/<change-id>/proposal.md,design.md, andtasks.mdare read and followed as instructions for implementation. - Boundary markers: There are no markers or system instructions provided to differentiate between the skill's hardcoded instructions and untrusted content within the change proposal files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify files, execute shell commands, run local scripts, and invoke the
npxpackage manager. - Sanitization: Content from the proposal files is not sanitized or validated before being interpreted as a task sequence by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Python logic via
scripts/cflx.pyand utilizes shell commands likegit statusto manage the local workspace and verify implementation states.
Audit Metadata