visual-design
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured to execute a local CLI utility for image generation tasks.
- Evidence: The instructions guide the agent to use a tool located at
~/.claude/bin/nano-bananaif theGEMINI_API_KEYenvironment variable is detected. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it incorporates content from external documents into its internal logic and prompts.
- Ingestion points: Data is read from
design-brief.md,competitive-landscape.md, andprd.mdfiles within thepm-workspace-docs/initiatives/active/[name]/directory. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no specified delimiters or safety instructions to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded within the input files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute local commands via a CLI and perform file system write operations (e.g., creating
visual-directions.md). - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not describe any validation or escaping of the content retrieved from external documents before using it to generate prompts.
Audit Metadata