compound-docs

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes shell commands using user-provided input in the 'Create new skill' menu option (Option 5). It instructs the agent to run python3 .claude/skills/skill-creator/scripts/init_skill.py [skill-name] using a name provided by the user. The lack of explicit sanitization instructions for this specific input poses a risk of command injection (e.g., a user providing a name like my-skill; rm -rf /).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Step 7 employs shell redirection (echo >>) to append content to existing documentation files. While filenames generated in Step 4 are sanitized, the use of variables like $REAL_FILE (derived from grep results) and conversation context within shell commands without strict escaping could lead to unintended command execution if those values contain shell metacharacters.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from the conversation history to generate structured documentation.
  • Ingestion points: Conversation history in Step 2, where symptoms, root causes, and module names are extracted.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to treat the gathered context as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including Bash (used for grep, mkdir, echo, cat, and script execution) and Write (used for file creation).
  • Sanitization: Filename sanitization is implemented in Step 4; however, no sanitization or escaping is performed on the documentation content itself before it is written to the file system or passed to shell commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 30, 2026, 01:20 AM