ce-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically identifies and executes sub-agents using names provided in the
review_agentsfield ofcompound-engineering.local.md. Because this file is located within the repository being reviewed, a malicious actor could submit a Pull Request that modifies this configuration to trigger the execution of unintended agent tasks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to the way it processes external data.
- Ingestion points: Pull request metadata (title, body, files) via
gh pr viewand the markdown body ofcompound-engineering.local.md. - Boundary markers: PR content and configuration context are passed to sub-agents without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute sub-agents via the
Tasktool, perform repository operations via theghCLI, and write files using theWritetool andfile-todosskill. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the ingested PR data before it is passed into the agent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes shell commands via the GitHub CLI (
gh) to perform actions like fetching PR metadata and checking out branches, which are influenced by the provided arguments.
Audit Metadata