skills/udecode/plate/workflows-plan/Gen Agent Trust Hub

workflows-plan

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands (gh issue create, linear issue create, open, cat) with variables derived from user-provided feature descriptions and titles. While filenames undergo kebab-casing, the title string is directly interpolated into CLI arguments (--title "<title>"). If a user provides a title containing shell metacharacters or command substitution patterns (e.g., $(...)), it could lead to unintended command execution depending on the agent's shell environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. It ingests untrusted data from the feature_description argument and from the content of existing brainstorm files (docs/brainstorms/*.md). This data is then used to guide the behavior of multiple research agents and the plan generation process.
  • Ingestion points: feature_description argument; content of local markdown files in docs/brainstorms/.
  • Boundary markers: The feature_description is wrapped in XML-like tags, but the content from brainstorm files is read and processed without explicit boundary isolation.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (ls, mkdir, gh, linear, open, cat) and trigger other specialized research agents.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for the content of the description or title before it is passed to research tasks or used in GitHub/Linear CLI commands beyond basic filename formatting.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 12, 2026, 03:34 AM