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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
deep_thinkengine utilizesasyncio.create_subprocess_execto run Python scripts and testing commands (pytest) within a local sandbox directory. This involves executing arbitrary code generated by the agent, which can be influenced by user-provided task instructions.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Thedispatch_taskanddispatch_batch_taskstools facilitate sending instructions to other agent instances listening on local network ports (localhost). This mechanism allows an agent to trigger the execution of arbitrary tasks in other processes.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documentation includes an 'Emergency Takeover' rule that explicitly directs the agent to 'switch identity' and utilize high-privilege local tools such asbashorfile_editorif worker dispatch fails, potentially bypassing intended restrictions.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Thesync_task_contexttool enables the agent to query and retrieve session data and conversation histories from other nodes on the local network, allowing for the movement of sensitive session information across different agent contexts.
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