github-pr-manager

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data from external sources, specifically Pull Request metadata (titles, bodies) and code diffs via tools like gh pr view and gh pr list.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md examples show usage of gh pr view and gh pr list which fetch PR content into the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: None identified. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the PR data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including executing shell commands (Bash), managing files, and performing GitHub write operations (merging, approving).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the fetched PR content before it is processed or used in subsequent commands.
  • [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill relies on the execution of shell commands such as gh, git, and npm. While these are necessary for the skill's primary purpose, they provide a powerful primitive that could be abused if an attacker influences the agent's logic through a malicious PR.
  • [Remote Code Execution Surface] (LOW): The skill's 'Batch PR Operations' and 'Hooks' sections demonstrate the execution of npm test and npm run build. If an attacker-controlled Pull Request modifies the scripts section of a package.json file, the agent may inadvertently execute malicious code during the automated testing or validation phase.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 21, 2026, 06:32 AM