agent-card-templates
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Privilege Escalation & Unverifiable Dependencies (HIGH): The script
scripts/validate-agent-card.shcontains logic to automatically install thejqutility usingsudo apt-get update,yum, orbrewif it is not found on the system. Running package managers with elevated privileges inside a utility script is a high-risk practice as it modifies the system state and downloads external software without explicit user confirmation of the installation command. - Command Injection via sed (MEDIUM): The
scripts/generate-agent-card.shscript usessedto perform string replacement for generating JSON files. It uses a fixed delimiter (|) and interpolates user-provided variables (likeAGENT_DESCorSERVICE_ENDPOINT) directly into the command string. An attacker providing a value containing the|character could break thesedcommand or potentially manipulate the file generation process. - Indirect Prompt Injection Surface (MEDIUM): The skill's primary purpose is generating structured metadata (Agent Cards) intended to be consumed by other AI agents (A2A). This creates an injection surface where a malicious user could craft a 'description' or 'skill' name within an agent card that, when parsed by a downstream agent, could influence its behavior. While the skill includes a validation script, it does not sanitize the content for prompt injection patterns.
- Ingestion points: User input via
read -pinscripts/generate-agent-card.shand fields within generated JSON files. - Boundary markers: None implemented; JSON values are interpolated directly into templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the local filesystem using
cpandsedvia theBashtool. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of user input is performed before it is written to the output JSON files.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata