agent-workflow-patterns
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [Dynamic Execution] (CRITICAL): File
templates/react-agent.tsuseseval()in thecalculatetool of themathProblemSolverexample. This allows arbitrary code execution because the input toeval()is generated by the LLM based on user-provided tasks. The code comment claiming it is 'Safe eval using Function constructor' is misleading as it uses the raweval()function. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The
reactAgentfunction intemplates/react-agent.tsis vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Ingests untrusted data through the
taskparameter (line 53) and viaresult.toolResults(line 152). - Boundary markers: Relies on weak natural language delimiters (THOUGHT, ACTION, OBSERVATION) without strict escaping or instruction isolation.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful system tools (
Bash,Write,Read) and a tool witheval()capabilities. - Sanitization: No input sanitization or output validation is implemented for external data processed by the agent.
- [Command Execution] (HIGH): The allowed tools in
SKILL.mdincludeBash,Write, andRead. When combined with the high-risk injection surface in thereactAgentpattern, an attacker can manipulate the agent into executing arbitrary shell commands or modifying system files. - [Unverifiable Dependencies] (MEDIUM): The
SKILL.mdfile references multiple templates (multi-agent-system.ts,workflow-orchestrator.ts, etc.) and a validation script (scripts/validate-agent.sh) that are missing from the provided skill package and cannot be audited.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata