rls-templates
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The scripts
apply-rls-policies.sh,test-rls-policies.sh, andaudit-rls.shinterpolate command-line arguments directly into SQL strings and shell commands executed viapsql. Specifically, inapply-rls-policies.sh, the use ofsed "s/TABLE_NAME/$table/g"to replace placeholders allows a malicious table name to break thesedcommand or inject SQL if the output is piped topsql. Intest-rls-policies.sh, variables like$user_idand$tableare used within SQL strings (e.g.,SET request.jwt.claim.sub = '$user_id') without sanitization, permitting SQL injection. - CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (MEDIUM): The skill documentation requires highly sensitive credentials to be set as environment variables, including
SUPABASE_DB_URL(which contains the database password) andSUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY. While necessary for database administration, the automation scripts do not include protections to prevent these secrets from being logged or exposed in the event of a shell environment compromise. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): Following the Category 8 assessment framework, this skill possesses a high-risk vulnerability surface. 1. Ingestion points: Command-line arguments (
$table,$user_id,$org_id) in all scripts. 2. Boundary markers: Absent; user input is directly interpolated. 3. Capability inventory: The skill usespsqlto execute arbitrary SQL andsedfor string manipulation, providing a direct path to database modification. 4. Sanitization: Absent; there is no validation of the format or content of the table names or UUIDs provided. The severity is HIGH because the skill processes external content and has explicit write/execute capabilities on the database.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata