secure-coding-generate
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) via its rule-loading mechanism.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses the
Readtool to ingest content from arbitrary markdown files in therules/directory based on the user-provided$ARGUMENTS. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are present to distinguish between legitimate rules and malicious instructions in the files.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to 'strictly follow' every rule to generate executable code and architectural decisions, giving external content high influence over the final output.
- Sanitization: There is no logic to validate or escape the content of the rule files before they are interpreted as requirements.
- Data Exposure (MEDIUM): The skill uses
GlobandReadtools to access the local file system. Because the file selection logic is based on natural language mapping of user arguments, a malicious user could attempt to manipulate the 'domain determination' step to read sensitive files outside the intendedrules/scope.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata