mcp-builder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The file
scripts/connections.pyimplements theMCPConnectionStdioclass, which uses themcplibrary to spawn subprocesses. This class takes acommandandargsto execute arbitrary programs on the local system for the purpose of testing MCP servers. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to fetch data frommodelcontextprotocol.ioandraw.githubusercontent.comusing WebFetch. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are specified for processing this external content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to arbitrary command execution via
scripts/connections.pyand is prompted to run commands likenpx @modelcontextprotocol/inspectorinSKILL.md. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the fetched remote content is performed before the agent uses it to plan or execute tasks.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The skill references several external URLs for documentation. These are from trusted sources (GitHub and the official MCP documentation site), which downgrades the severity of the download finding itself to LOW per [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE], though the content remains an injection risk.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata