mcp-management

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill is designed to execute arbitrary shell commands defined in .mcp.json. The MCPClientManager.connectToServer method in mcp-client.ts uses StdioClientTransport to spawn subprocesses based on user-provided configuration (command and args).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The documentation and example configurations (README.md, references/configuration.md) encourage using npx -y to download and execute remote packages from NPM at runtime. This bypasses version pinning and integrity checks.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It explicitly facilitates reading data from external sources (e.g., brave-search, fetch, puppeteer) and feeding it to the LLM. There are no evident sanitization or boundary marking mechanisms to prevent malicious instructions embedded in web pages or search results from hijacking the agent.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (HIGH): The skill manages sensitive credentials (API keys) via environment variables and configuration files (.mcp.json). While it supports environment variable substitution, the recommendation to symlink the configuration to a common location (.gemini/settings.json) increases the exposure surface of these secrets.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (MEDIUM): A combination of the filesystem or memory tools with the fetch or search tools provides a direct path for exfiltrating sensitive local data to external endpoints.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 10:49 PM