macos-safari

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local files containing user browsing data.
  • Evidence in SKILL.md: Uses sqlite3 to query ~/Library/Safari/History.db for visit titles and URLs.
  • Evidence in SKILL.md: Uses plutil to read and search ~/Library/Safari/Bookmarks.plist.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill can execute arbitrary JavaScript within the context of any open web page.
  • Evidence: scripts/javascript/run.applescript uses the do JavaScript command to run code provided as an argument.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the osascript command to control system applications and behavior.
  • Evidence: Multiple scripts in the scripts/ directory use osascript to manage tabs, windows, and URLs.
  • Evidence: scripts/tab/email-contents.applescript triggers the Mail application to process the current tab content.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection when processing untrusted content from the web.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/tab/source.applescript (HTML source), scripts/tab/title.applescript (page titles), and scripts/tab/list.applescript (tab names and URLs).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when the agent retrieves web content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute JavaScript, open arbitrary URLs, and read sensitive local files (History.db, Bookmarks.plist).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the data retrieved from web pages before it is returned to the agent context.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation suggests installation via external package managers.
  • Evidence in README.md: Instructions for installation using npx and skills.sh.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 13, 2026, 07:18 PM