create-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection surface detected.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
issueBodyandbranchNamefrom~/.config/marshroom/state.jsonas well as the current branch name from the git environment. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are applied when interpolating the issue content into the Pull Request body.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for
git push,gh pr create/edit, and writing to local configuration files viajq. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping for the
issueBodyor branch names before they are used in command arguments or PR descriptions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes multiple shell commands including
git,gh,jq, and the vendor-specific toolmarsh. - Step 7 uses shell command substitution (
$(gh pr view ...)) which can lead to unintended command execution if the PR body contains shell-active characters. - Step 9 involves an atomic file write using
jqandmv, modifying the~/.config/marshroom/state.jsonfile. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs legitimate but notable data transfer operations.
- It executes
git push -u origin HEAD, which uploads local source code to a remote server. - It extracts local metadata (issue titles and bodies) from the
marshroomconfiguration and publishes them to GitHub as public Pull Request content.
Audit Metadata