article-list-processor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script in
index.tsuseschild_process.spawnto runnpm run skill:verify. While the command is static and triggered internally, it represents the execution of local shell processes. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs outbound HTTP requests using
node-fetchto arbitrary URLs provided in user-supplied Markdown files. This network activity is necessary for the skill's stated purpose of article crawling but allows the agent to interact with any external domain. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it retrieves content from external web pages and injects it directly into the AI prompt for processing.
- Ingestion points: External content is fetched in
index.tsviafetchArticleContentand passed to thegenerateContentfunction. - Boundary markers: The prompt construction in
buildArticleLinkPrompt(referenced inindex.ts) does not appear to use robust delimiters or instructions to the model to ignore potential commands embedded in the crawled text. - Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to read/write to the local file system (
local_inputs,archive,outputs), perform network requests, and execute subprocesses vianpm. - Sanitization: The content extracted via
@mozilla/readabilityis trimmed but otherwise unsanitized before being sent to the LLM, leaving the agent open to instructions hidden in the crawled articles.
Audit Metadata