github-repo-publish
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates values extracted from
package.json(such as the name and description fields) directly into shell commands (e.g.,gh repo create $REPO_NAME,gh repo edit --description "$DESCRIPTION"). If these fields in the local project file contain shell metacharacters like semicolons or backticks, it could lead to arbitrary command execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes
node -p "require('./package.json').version"to retrieve versioning information. This method treats the JSON file as a JavaScript module viarequire(), which can be exploited if the file contains malicious logic (e.g., JavaScript getters) disguised as data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Modifies global environment settings by running
git config --global http.proxy. This changes the proxy settings for all Git operations on the user's machine, potentially disrupting other workflows or intercepting traffic if the proxy address is untrusted. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Utilizes
npx vsce packageto bundle artifacts. This command dynamically downloads and executes thevscepackage from the npm registry, introducing a dependency on external package availability and the security of the npm supply chain. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The shell logic for cleaning the package name (
echo "$PACKAGE_NAME" | sed ...) is vulnerable to injection because the variable$PACKAGE_NAMEis expanded by the shell before being passed toecho.
Audit Metadata