skills/wania-kazmi/claude-code-autonomous-agent-workflow/mcp-code-execution-template/Gen Agent Trust Hub
mcp-code-execution-template
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/execute.pyfile usessubprocess.runto execute TypeScript files using runners such astsxorts-node. This functionality allows for the execution of arbitrary commands on the host system. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a pattern where the agent writes code to a workspace directory and then executes it. This provides a direct mechanism for running arbitrary logic that could be influenced by malicious prompts or external data.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
servers/mcp-client.tsutility includes thehttpToolCallfunction, which uses thefetchAPI to send data to external HTTP endpoints. These endpoints are determined by configuration files or environment variables, posing a risk of unauthorized data transmission. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes data from external MCP servers without applying sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context through wrappers like
servers/example-server/fetchData.ts. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the template wrappers.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured with access to powerful tools, including
Bash,Write, andEdit. - Sanitization: The implementation lacks logic to validate or sanitize tool outputs before they are processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata