intent-engine
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill instructs the user or agent to install the
@origintask/intent-engineNPM package and theintent-engineCargo crate, which are from unverified third-party sources not included in the trusted organizations list. - Evidence:
npm install -g @origintask/intent-engineandcargo install intent-engineinstructions inSKILL.md. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill relies on the execution of a local CLI binary (
ie) for its core functionality. This binary's internal logic is opaque to the AI agent and the host system. - Evidence: Frequent use of commands like
ie status,ie plan, andie logthroughout the workflow. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill's architecture for 'amnesia recovery' via a persistent memory store is a surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions stored in task specs or decision logs could be re-ingested by the agent in a later session.
- Ingestion points: Output from
ie statusandie searchretrieved into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is not instructed to treat retrieved 'memory' as untrusted or to use delimiters.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (
ie), file piping, and package installation. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved markdown strings is mentioned or performed.
Audit Metadata