arduino-code-generator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill documentation and SKILL.md refer to
scripts/generate_snippet.pyas a primary tool (e.g.,uv run --no-project scripts/generate_snippet.py). However, this file is not present in the skill package, making its logic and any external dependencies it might fetch unverifiable. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (LOW): The verification scripts
scripts/verify_patterns.shandscripts/verify_patterns.ps1executearduino-cli. While this is an industry-standard tool for the domain, it constitutes subprocess execution of an external binary that must be present in the user's environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): Analysis of the Indirect Prompt Injection surface (Category 8):
- Ingestion points: User-provided requirements in natural language (workflow/step1-identify-pattern.md).
- Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates or workflow instructions.
- Capability inventory: Code generation (text output) and local compilation via
arduino-cli(subprocess execution). - Sanitization: There are no instructions in
workflow/step3-generate-code.mdto sanitize user-provided strings (e.g., SSID, passwords, or sensor names) before interpolating them into code templates, which could lead to code-breaking injections or malicious comments if an attacker provides crafted input.
Audit Metadata