Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF files to extract text and structure, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Found in
SKILL.md,forms.md, and scripts likeextract_form_structure.pywhich usepypdfandpdfplumberto read content from external files. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or 'ignore' instructions for data extracted from PDFs before it is returned to the agent context.
- Capability inventory: The agent can write files, convert images, and execute shell commands (
qpdf,magick, etc.) based on the processed data. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or escaping of extracted text is present in the provided scripts or instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdandforms.mdfrequently direct the agent to execute external command-line utilities. - Evidence: Commands include
pdftotext,qpdf,pdftk, andmagick(ImageMagick) for PDF processing and image manipulation. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyutilizes runtime modification of imported libraries. - Evidence: The function
monkeypatch_pydpf_methodredefinespypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inheritedat runtime to alter how PDF field attributes are retrieved.
Audit Metadata