ssh-tool

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script uses child_process.spawn to invoke the system SSH client, enabling the execution of arbitrary commands on remote servers.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The tool accepts a --password command-line argument, which results in the SSH password being visible in cleartext in the system's process list (e.g., via ps or top), exposing it to other users and local processes.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The --key parameter allows the tool to access any local file path to load SSH private keys, creating a risk where sensitive identity files could be accessed or exfiltrated if the path is controlled by an untrusted source.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script explicitly disables SSH host key verification by passing StrictHostKeyChecking=no and UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null to the SSH command. This removes the primary defense against Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks, allowing an attacker to intercept the connection and potentially execute commands on the target host.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it returns raw, unsanitized output from remote commands to the agent context.
  • Ingestion points: Remote command output (stdout/stderr) processed in ssh-tool.js.
  • Boundary markers: None; raw output is returned without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: Remote command execution, interactive shell access, and local file reads (via --key).
  • Sanitization: No validation or escaping is performed on the data returned from the remote host.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 05:11 AM