gitlab-kiro
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an Indirect Prompt Injection attack surface. It fetches and processes external, untrusted data (MR titles, descriptions, diffs, and comments) from GitLab via the
glabCLI. This content is then used to construct prompts for subagents (code-reviewer,security, andqa). An attacker could embed malicious instructions in an MR to influence the review results or subsequent actions. - Ingestion points: Data is ingested from
glab mr view,glab mr diff, andglab mr note listcommands as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the LLM to ignore embedded commands within the ingested MR data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
glab), read local convention files, and invoke other subagents. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the fetched MR content before it is interpolated into subagent queries.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
shelltool to execute variousglabCLI commands. While the commands are parameterized withmr_idandrepo_refextracted from user-provided URLs, the reliance on the agent's parsing logic for these parameters is a standard part of its operation. The scope of execution is limited to the functionality provided by theglabtool.
Audit Metadata