workflow-orchestrator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell command injection vulnerability in scripts/analyze-task.sh. The script uses an unquoted heredoc (cat << EOF) to generate JSON output containing the user-provided task description. Because the delimiter is unquoted, the shell expands variables and executes command substitutions (e.g., $(...)) within the task string. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system by providing a crafted task description.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell command injection vulnerability in scripts/generate-workflow.sh. The script uses sed inside double quotes to interpolate the task name. This causes the shell to evaluate any command substitutions (e.g., $(...)) present in the task name before the sed command is executed, leading to arbitrary code execution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its architecture of processing untrusted task data for agent orchestration.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/analyze-task.sh and scripts/generate-workflow.sh take task descriptions as input.
  • Boundary markers: No markers or instructions are present to prevent agents from interpreting data content as instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Agent configurations grant extensive privileges, including arbitrary bash command execution and full file system write access.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for task strings before they are used in script logic or agent prompts.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 28, 2026, 10:30 AM