gitops-workflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): In
SKILL.md, the Flux installation command usescurl -s https://fluxcd.io/install.sh | sudo bash. This is a classic remote code execution vector that executes an unverified script from the internet with root privileges. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): In both
SKILL.mdandreferences/argocd-setup.md, the skill instructs the user to executekubectl applyon manifests hosted atraw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/. Sinceargoprojis not in the Trusted Organizations list, this is a high-risk download and execution of remote configuration. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill performs sensitive operations such as retrieving administrative secrets from the cluster (
argocd-initial-admin-secret) and decoding them. While intended for setup, these commands interact with sensitive cluster credentials. - DYNAMIC_EXECUTION (MEDIUM):
references/sync-policies.mdcontains an embedded Lua script for ArgoCD health checks. This script is injected into a Kubernetes ConfigMap and executed dynamically by the ArgoCD controller. - INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill defines ingestion points for untrusted data in
SKILL.mdvia therepoURLfields for ArgoCD and Flux. An attacker who gains control of the specified Git repository could inject malicious manifests or instructions that the agent or the GitOps controller would then process. There are no boundary markers or sanitization steps documented for these inputs.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata