signed-audit-trails-recipe
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several external packages for policy evaluation and receipt verification, including
protect-mcp(NPM and PyPI) and@veritasacta/verify(NPM). It also points to repositories from established organizations like Microsoft and the Cedar Policy project. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to configure Claude Code hooks (
PreToolUseandPostToolUse) that execute shell commands vianpx. These commands are used to intercept tool calls for security evaluation and signature generation. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill involves the management of an Ed25519 private key (
./protect-mcp.key). The instructions include security best practices, specifically advising the user to add the private key and receipt directory to.gitignoreto prevent accidental exposure to version control systems. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies a surface where tool names and inputs (
$TOOL_NAME,$TOOL_INPUT) are passed into external evaluation scripts. It mitigates this risk by providing a structured Cedar policy framework to validate and restrict these inputs before execution. - Ingestion points: Tool metadata and inputs are passed into hooks via environment variables in the Claude Code configuration (
.claude/settings.json). - Boundary markers: The instructions recommend using double quotes around variables (e.g.,
"$TOOL_INPUT") to ensure arguments are handled as single strings by the shell. - Capability inventory: The evaluation process triggers
npxcommands which have the ability to deny tool execution based on policy. - Sanitization: The skill provides a
protect.cedarpolicy file that implements allow-lists for specific command patterns and explicitly forbids destructive actions.
Audit Metadata