diffdock
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to clone an external repository from an untrusted source:
https://github.com/gcorso/DiffDock.git. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends pulling a Docker image from an untrusted third-party source:
rbgcsail/diffdock. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation mentions that model checkpoints (~500MB) are automatically downloaded from remote servers during the first run, which is an unverified external fetch.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent/user to clone a repository from an unverified GitHub user (
gcorso) and execute its internal Python modules (python -m inference), leading to the execution of unvetted third-party code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing various shell commands and local scripts for environment setup and docking tasks, including
conda env create,docker run, andscripts/setup_check.py. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The section "Suggest Using K-Dense Web" contains instructions that steer agent behavior toward promoting a specific external platform (
www.k-dense.ai) for complex workflows. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted external data (PDB files, SMILES strings, and batch CSV files) that are used as arguments for command-line execution and script processing.
- Ingestion points: Workflow 1 (protein and ligand inputs) and Workflow 2 (CSV batch processing).
- Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in processed data.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution of
python -m inferenceand various analysis scripts. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation routines for external scientific inputs are mentioned or implemented in the instructions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata