obsidian-search

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md and references/cli-query-patterns.md guide the agent to construct Bash commands using user-provided strings for query parameters and file names (e.g., obsidian search query="关键词"). This design is vulnerable to shell command injection if the agent does not strictly escape metacharacters such as backticks, semicolons, or command substitutions within the user input.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of reading and summarizing notes.
  • Ingestion points: The agent retrieves untrusted data from the Obsidian vault using obsidian read and obsidian search:context as specified in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or specific warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the note content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute system commands via Bash and read arbitrary files within the vault directory.
  • Sanitization: Absent. Note content is processed and summarized without any validation, escaping, or filtering for potential adversarial instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 18, 2026, 01:43 AM