wan-cover-plus
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell command execution using the
subprocessmodule. - Evidence: In
scripts/postprocess.py, the_run_commandfunction usessubprocess.runto executeffmpegandffprobefor media processing tasks such as duration probing, audio muxing, and subtitle burning. - Context: The binary paths are configurable in
config.yaml, and the operations involve paths provided in the task input. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads local file contents and transmits them to an external service.
- Evidence: In
scripts/wan_client.py, the_encode_local_filefunction reads the bytes of local files specified in thereference_imagesandreference_videosfields. This data is base64-encoded and sent to the DashScope API atdashscope.aliyuncs.com. - Concern: The skill does not restrict the directories from which files can be read, which could allow an attacker to exfiltrate sensitive system files if they can influence the input paths.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from external sources.
- Evidence: The
scripts/wan_client.pyscript usesrequests.getto download generated image and video assets from Alibaba Cloud's API endpoints. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an indirect prompt injection surface due to its data processing model.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied JSON input processed in
scripts/generate.pyvia the--inputargument. - Boundary markers: No explicit markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the prompt construction logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read local files, execute shell commands, and make network requests.
- Sanitization: The
scripts/validator.pyscript verifies that file paths exist on the local system but does not restrict those paths to a safe or whitelisted directory.
Audit Metadata