wan-cover-plus

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell command execution using the subprocess module.
  • Evidence: In scripts/postprocess.py, the _run_command function uses subprocess.run to execute ffmpeg and ffprobe for media processing tasks such as duration probing, audio muxing, and subtitle burning.
  • Context: The binary paths are configurable in config.yaml, and the operations involve paths provided in the task input.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads local file contents and transmits them to an external service.
  • Evidence: In scripts/wan_client.py, the _encode_local_file function reads the bytes of local files specified in the reference_images and reference_videos fields. This data is base64-encoded and sent to the DashScope API at dashscope.aliyuncs.com.
  • Concern: The skill does not restrict the directories from which files can be read, which could allow an attacker to exfiltrate sensitive system files if they can influence the input paths.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from external sources.
  • Evidence: The scripts/wan_client.py script uses requests.get to download generated image and video assets from Alibaba Cloud's API endpoints.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an indirect prompt injection surface due to its data processing model.
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied JSON input processed in scripts/generate.py via the --input argument.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the prompt construction logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can read local files, execute shell commands, and make network requests.
  • Sanitization: The scripts/validator.py script verifies that file paths exist on the local system but does not restrict those paths to a safe or whitelisted directory.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 28, 2026, 05:55 PM