maestro
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The
ralph-qa-engine.jsscript useschild_process.spawnSyncwithshell: trueto execute commands passed as arguments. This allows the AI agent to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system under the context of running tests. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The
Stophook (hooks/stop.js) allows the skill to override the user's intent to end a session. It returns a block signal to the CLI, forcing the user into continued autonomous iterations until iteration limits are reached or manual state files are deleted. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The
git-worktreesskill automatically invokes package installers such asnpm install,pip install, andgo mod downloadwhen setting up a new workspace. This creates a risk of executing malicious lifecycle scripts if the repository being processed contains untrusted dependencies. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (LOW): The
.mcp.jsonconfiguration usesnpxto fetch and execute the@upstash/context7-mcppackage from a remote registry at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The memory system in
hooks/pre-compact.jsingests session history and compact summaries intobrain.jsonlwithout explicit sanitization or boundary markers, creating an indirect prompt injection surface. - Ingestion points: Session transcripts are read via
extractLastSummaryfrom the project's transcript directory. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content were found in the ingestion logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has subprocess execution capabilities via the Ralph Wiggum QA engine.
- Sanitization: Content is parsed as JSON but not sanitized before being placed into the agent's long-term memory context.
Audit Metadata