agent-memory-mcp
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (HIGH): The skill instructs the user to clone a repository from an untrusted GitHub account (
webzler/agentMemory) that is not within the recognized trust scope. - Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/webzler/agentMemory.git .agent/skills/agent-memoryin SKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The setup and usage instructions involve executing scripts from the downloaded repository, allowing for arbitrary code execution on the host machine.
- Evidence:
npm install,npm run compile, andnpm run start-serverin SKILL.md. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): By downloading and running an unverified MCP server, the skill enables remote code execution capabilities where the server logic (not visible in this file) controls the agent's interaction with the system.
- Evidence: The skill's primary function is to launch an external server that manages project memory.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill creates an Indirect Prompt Injection surface (Category 8) by processing untrusted project data and workspace files into the agent's memory bank.
- Ingestion points:
memory_writetool and the target workspace path passed to the server. - Boundary markers: Absent in the documentation.
- Capability inventory: Read/Write access to the workspace via tools; execution via npm scripts.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the 'content' or workspace data is mentioned.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata