skills/xfstudio/skills/pdf/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pdf

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest data from external, potentially malicious PDF files, which is a primary vector for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads data using PdfReader, pdfplumber, and pytesseract in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill provides no instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit instructions found within the processed PDFs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write files (writer.write, c.save, to_excel) and execute system commands via CLI tools (qpdf, pdftk).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the extracted text or metadata before it is processed or used to drive agent actions.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill documentation includes and encourages the use of system-level command-line tools like qpdf, pdftotext, and pdftk. If an agent invokes these tools using arguments derived directly from untrusted PDF metadata (e.g., a maliciously crafted 'Title' field), it could lead to command injection if the underlying shell is not handled securely.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 04:30 AM