dingtalk-connection
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Persistence Mechanism] (HIGH): The file
setup_service.pycreates a macOS LaunchAgent at~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clawdbot.dingtalk-bridge.plist. This configuration ensures the bridge script executes automatically at login and remains running in the background. While functional for a bridge service, it constitutes a persistence mechanism. - [Credential Exposure] (HIGH): The
setup_service.pyscript extracts values from the environment, includingDINGTALK_SIGNING_SECRET, and writes them in plain text into theEnvironmentVariablesblock of the generated.plistfile. This exposes cryptographic secrets to any local process capable of reading files in the user'sLaunchAgentsdirectory. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): As described in
SKILL.mdandREADME.md, the bridge ingests messages from external users via DingTalk webhooks. These messages are forwarded to an AI agent, creating a surface where untrusted user input can influence the agent's downstream behavior. - Ingestion points: DingTalk webhook endpoint (
/dingtalk). - Boundary markers: None visible (implementation of
bridge.pyis missing from the provided files). - Capability inventory: WebSocket connection to local gateway; subprocess execution via
uv runin the persistence service. - Sanitization: None detected in the configuration files provided.
- [Missing Source Code] (MEDIUM): The primary logic for the bridge (
bridge.py) is referenced in all documentation and scripts but is not included in the skill package. This prevents a full audit of the data handling and sanitization logic.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata