awkn-skills
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The
awkn-danger-gemini-webskill utilizes the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) to programmatically extract sensitive session cookies (__Secure-1PSIDand__Secure-1PSIDTS) from the user's local Chrome browser to authenticate against Google Gemini services. This bypasses standard security boundaries between applications. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple skills, including
awkn-post-to-wechatandawkn-compress-image, use thechild_process.spawnandexecSyncmodules to execute system-level utilities such asosascript,xdotool,powershell,swift,sips, andimagemagick. This provides a significant attack surface if the inputs to these commands are not perfectly sanitized. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
awkn-post-to-wechatskill dynamically generates Swift scripts at runtime, writes them to temporary directories, and executes them using the system'sswiftinterpreter to manipulate the system clipboard. This pattern of dynamic code generation and execution is a high-risk vector. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The system automates login and session management for both Google and WeChat accounts. It stores and rotates session tokens locally in the
awkn-skills/gemini-webdirectory, which could be targeted by other malicious software on the same machine. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skills
awkn-content-decompositionandawkn-viral-articleingest large amounts of untrusted external content (books, articles, or web pages) and interpolate them directly into complex prompt templates. - Ingestion points: File paths or pasted text in scripts like
wechat-browser.tsandwechat-article.ts. - Boundary markers: The skills rely on basic markdown headers or simple text instructions, which may fail to prevent an attacker from embedding hidden instructions in the source text.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to browser automation (CDP), system clipboard, and arbitrary command execution, making the potential impact of a successful injection high.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of robust sanitization or filtering of user-provided content before it reaches the AI model or the automation scripts.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata