memory-orchestrator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic loading of sub-skills using variable-dependent paths:
.github/skills/{role}/SKILL.md. This pattern introduces a risk of path traversal if the{role}variable, generated during the automatedtask_planphase, is manipulated to point to unintended local files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its reliance on external data sources for task planning and context building.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
memory_get_context(project_id, task_description)andgit_get_changes(project_id). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat data from git history or long-term memory as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator has the authority to load secondary skills, execute git commands (
git_sync), and commit information to memory. - Sanitization: The skill lacks mechanisms to sanitize or validate the content of the project context or git changes before using them to influence the planning and execution phases.
Audit Metadata