follow-unfollow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes data from external X (Twitter) profiles which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data entering the agent context via the
GET /x/users/{username}endpoint in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit delimiters to isolate untrusted profile data from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform account state changes via
POST /x/users/{id}/followandDELETE /x/users/{id}/followacross all endpoints described. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external profile content is described in the workflow.
Audit Metadata