add-skill

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages local shell commands including mkdir, cp, ls, grep, and diff. These are primarily used for directory management and synchronizing skill definitions between platform-specific folders (.claude/, .cursor/, and .codex/).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: A core component of the skill involves updating JavaScript files (.claude/hooks/skill-forced-eval.js and .cursor/hooks/cursor-skill-eval.js) to register new triggers. It instructs the AI to insert user-defined strings into these files, which could lead to code or instruction injection if the input contains malicious payloads designed to escape the JavaScript string or array context.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Ingestion points: User-provided inputs (skill names, descriptions, and trigger words) are ingested to generate new documentation and configuration files.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific boundary markers or 'ignore' directives to prevent the AI from obeying malicious instructions embedded within the user-provided data for the new skill.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem and execute shell commands to modify the agent's own configuration and execution hooks.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation logic to ensure that generated skill names (kebab-case) or trigger words do not contain control characters or malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 7, 2026, 09:04 AM