continuous-learning-v2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection. The background observer agent (
agents/start-observer.sh) reads session logs containing raw tool outputs and passes them to an LLM to generate 'instincts'. Malicious instructions embedded in files read or processed during a session could influence this automated learning process. - Ingestion points: Session logs at
~/.claude/homunculus/projects/<hash>/observations.jsonlare read by the observer agent. - Boundary markers: The agent prompt uses format specifications and rules (e.g., 'Never include actual code snippets') as weak boundaries, but lacks robust delimiters for untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The system can write YAML and Markdown files to the local filesystem and trigger the
claudeCLI. - Sanitization: Data is truncated to 5000 characters in
hooks/observe.sh, but no content-based sanitization or instruction filtering is performed. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/instinct-cli.pyutility provides animportcommand that can fetch content from any user-provided URL usingurllib.request. While intended for sharing patterns, this allows the introduction of external data into the agent's internal knowledge base. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes local subprocesses including
gitfor repository detection and theclaudeCLI for background analysis. These operations are essential to the skill's stated purpose of continuous learning.
Audit Metadata