oneskill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
child_process.spawnSyncto execute theopenskillsCLI tool and perform build operations. Evidence is found insrc/core/openskills.ts(runningnpm run build),src/commands/sync.ts, andsrc/commands/list.ts(executing theopenskillsbinary with arguments). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches skill metadata and search results from an external registry. Evidence in
src/core/registry.tsshowsfetchcalls tohttps://skillsdirectory.com/api/registry. The registry URL can be overridden via theONESKILL_REGISTRY_URLenvironment variable, which could lead to fetching data from malicious sources. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a workflow for the discovery and installation of external code ('Agent Skills'). It provides instructions for the agent to execute
npx openskills install <source>, which downloads and executes arbitrary code from GitHub or a registry. Evidence is found in theSKILL.mdandREADME.mdworkflow definitions. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and discloses internal directory structures to the agent context. The
doctorcommand insrc/commands/doctor.tsprints absolute paths for sensitive configuration directories such as.claude/skills,.gemini/skills, and.agent/skillsto the agent's output. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection from the external registry data. Ingestion points: Ingests skill names, descriptions, and tags from
skillsdirectory.cominsrc/core/registry.ts. Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety warnings are used when presenting registry data to the agent. Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute commands viaspawnSyncand modify the filesystem via symlinks. Sanitization: Registry data is extracted and returned to the agent without validation or escaping in thenormalizeSkillfunction.
Audit Metadata