configure-openclaw
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In Step 7, the skill uses the
evalcommand to executecurlfor testing the gateway connection. The$AUTH_HEADERand$GATEWAY_URLvariables, which are populated directly from user input, are interpolated into the shell command string. An attacker could provide a URL or header containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,`,$(...)) to execute arbitrary commands on the host system.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill prompts users for sensitive 'Authorization' headers (such as Bearer tokens) and writes them in cleartext to the~/.claude/omc_config.openclaw.jsonfile. This exposes long-lived authentication credentials to any local user or process with read access to the directory.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by allowing users to define instruction templates that incorporate untrusted session data which is then sent to external gateways.\n - Ingestion points: Runtime data such as user prompts (
{{prompt}}), questions ({{question}}), and tool names ({{toolName}}) used in the templates defined in Step 5.\n - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the template construction.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform arbitrary network requests via
curland write to the filesystem usingjqandmkdir.\n - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the interpolated variables is performed before transmission.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata