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Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • Data Exposure (HIGH): The skill directly accesses and reads from ~/.claude/.omc-config.json. The ~/.claude/ directory is a sensitive location used by Claude Code to store internal configuration and potentially credentials.
  • Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code (HIGH): The documentation instructs the user to run /oh-my-claudecode:omc-setup, which it explicitly states "downloads the configuration" from a repository owned by an untrusted external user (Yeachan-Heo). This bypasses standard package management and executes/installs unverified remote content.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill processes untrusted data from session-history.json and token-tracking.jsonl.
  • Ingestion points: Reads files generated from previous (potentially attacker-influenced) interactions.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the history data.
  • Capability inventory: File read (cat), JSON parsing (jq), and the ability to generate "Recommendations" that influence the agent's future behavior/configuration.
  • Sanitization: None. Data is piped directly from files into jq and then displayed/used for logic.
  • Privilege Escalation (MEDIUM): The skill performs file system reconnaissance by checking for the existence of specific directories and configuration files in the user's home directory to determine execution modes.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 10:43 PM