skill

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The /skill setup and /skill scan subcommands implement shell script blocks that use find, grep, and sed within a sh -c execution context. While used for metadata extraction from skill files, executing shell logic on content derived from potentially untrusted project-level or imported files creates an attack surface for command injection if the input is not strictly sanitized.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The Import Skill feature in the setup wizard explicitly supports downloading skill definitions from arbitrary external URLs. This allows for the introduction of unverified code or instructions into the agent's persistent skill storage without source validation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from SKILL.md files in both user and project scopes.
  • Ingestion points: File reads in ~/.claude/skills/omc-learned/ and .omc/skills/ via /skill info, /skill search, and /skill scan.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; content is displayed directly to the agent context.
  • Capability inventory: Includes shell command execution (mkdir, find), and file read/write operations.
  • Sanitization: Only basic name validation (lowercase/hyphens) is performed; the content of the skills and the results of shell-based parsing are not sanitized before being returned to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 27, 2026, 07:38 AM