ultrapilot

[Skill Scanner] Credential file access detected All findings: [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] This Ultrapilot skill appears functionally coherent and aligned with its stated purpose (parallel decomposition, file ownership, worker orchestration, integration, and validation). I found no direct malicious code, hardcoded credentials, or obfuscated payloads in the provided document. Primary security considerations are operational: (1) spawn_sub_agent is a blind spot — it likely invokes remote agent/model infrastructure and the document does not specify endpoints, data residency, or retention policies; that can lead to accidental leakage of repository contents or secrets if used without controls; (2) instructions to delete state files can remove audit trails; and (3) worker permissions to create files broaden the attack surface if a sub-agent is compromised. Recommend: ensure spawn_sub_agent executes in a vetted sandbox or local-only mode, verify where agent calls are sent and how data is handled, enforce least-privilege for workers, and consider retention or protected archival (instead of force-deleting) of state files for auditability. Overall, low probability of intentional malware but non-trivial operational risk if agent endpoints are untrusted. LLM verification: No explicit malware or obfuscated backdoor code is present in the provided skill documentation. The dominant security risk is data exposure: repository code, configuration, and potentially secrets can be included in prompts and sent to sub-agents via spawn_sub_agent. This is acceptable if spawn_sub_agent is provably local/on-premise or if robust sanitization/allowlists are enforced. Without those guarantees, treat the skill as high-privilege and potentially dangerous for private/proprietary repo