mcp-cli

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly commands the agent to download and execute a shell script from a non-trusted repository using the 'curl | bash' pattern. This facilitates the execution of unverified remote code. Evidence: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/philschmid/mcp-cli/main/install.sh | bash found in SKILL.md and references/testing-flow.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates executing local development scripts via bun, which could execute malicious code if the local environment is compromised. Evidence: bun run src/index.ts in SKILL.md.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Configuration examples in the skill's reference files contain hardcoded string literals for API keys and Authorization tokens. While used for demonstration, these suggest a practice of embedding secrets in plaintext configuration. Evidence: "API_KEY": "test-key-123" and "Authorization": "Bearer token" in references/configuration-and-arguments.md.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs downloads from external domains, specifically GitHub's raw content servers. Evidence: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/philschmid/mcp-cli/main/install.sh.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it reads tool outputs from external MCP servers and pipes them into other commands without sanitization. Ingestion points: outputs from mcp-cli call in references/output-debugging-and-chaining.md. Boundary markers: None. Capability inventory: subprocess calls, file reads, and shell piping. Sanitization: None.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/philschmid/mcp-cli/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Mar 9, 2026, 07:19 PM