gha
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): The skill possesses a significant attack surface for Indirect Prompt Injection.
- Ingestion points: It ingests untrusted external content from GitHub Actions logs and Pull Request titles/descriptions via the
ghCLI. - Capability inventory: It performs complex reasoning over this data to generate root cause hypotheses and actionable recommendations (e.g., 'Recommendation' section).
- Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers (like XML tags or specific delimiters) used to separate the instructions from the untrusted log data being analyzed.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the retrieved logs or PR metadata before processing.
- Risk: An attacker can control the content of workflow logs (e.g., by submitting a malicious PR that prints specific strings). These logs could contain instructions that trick the agent into providing false root cause analyses or recommending malicious commands to the user.
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill explicitly requires and uses the
ghCLI to interact with GitHub. - Evidence: Uses
gh run list,gh run view, andgh pr listcommands. - Risk: While the prompt focuses on read operations, the agent's actual capability depends on the permissions of the
GH_TOKENin the environment. If the token has write access, it increases the potential impact of a successful prompt injection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata