skills/ynulihao/agentskillos/xlsx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

xlsx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill processes untrusted Excel files provided as input and uses LibreOffice (a complex office suite) to recalculate them. This creates a high-risk attack surface where a malicious file could exploit vulnerabilities in the parser or the agent's execution environment.
  • Ingestion points: recalc.py accepts a filename argument from the command line.
  • Boundary markers: None. The script does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content within the Excel file.
  • Capability inventory: Uses subprocess.run to execute system commands and the LibreOffice macro provides ThisComponent.store() which grants file-write capabilities.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the Excel file content is performed before processing.
  • Persistence Mechanisms (HIGH): The setup_libreoffice_macro function in recalc.py writes a StarBasic macro (Module1.xba) to the user's permanent LibreOffice configuration directory (e.g., ~/.config/libreoffice/4/user/basic/Standard). This macro remains on the system across sessions.
  • Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The script generates StarBasic code at runtime, writes it to a file, and then invokes it using the soffice binary. Although the generated code is a hardcoded string, this pattern of dynamic script generation and execution is a medium-risk behavior.
  • Command Execution (LOW): The script uses subprocess.run to call soffice, timeout, and gtimeout. It uses argument lists which prevents basic shell injection, but it remains a low-level system interaction.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 01:40 PM