background-jobs
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted external data while possessing high-privilege capabilities (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Entry points for untrusted data are defined in
process_webhook(SKILL.md) andsync_external_data(scripts/arq-worker-template.py). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or explicit instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands in the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The templates include capabilities for persistent database modification via SQLAlchemy (
scripts/arq-worker-template.py) and external network requests viahttpxandrequests(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The provided templates do not demonstrate input validation, escaping, or sanitization logic for external payloads.
- Credentials Unsafe (LOW): Hardcoded placeholder credentials found in worker configuration.
- Evidence: The
database_urlinscripts/arq-worker-template.pycontainsuser:pass. While these are clearly placeholders for development, they represent a credential exposure risk if replaced with real values in the source code.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata